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CONTENT, PURPOSE, OR BOTH?
Rebecca Tushnet*
Abstract: Most debates about the proper meaning of “transformativeness” in fair use are
really about a larger shift towards more robust fair use. Part I of this short Article explores
the copyright-restrictionist turn towards defending fair use, whereas in the past critics of
copyright’s broad scope were more likely to argue that fair use was too fragile to protect free
speech and creativity in the digital age. Part II looks at some of the major cases supporting
that rhetorical and political shift. Although it hasn’t broken decisively with the past, current
case law makes more salient the freedoms many types of uses and users have to proceed
without copyright owners’ authorization. Part III discusses some of the strongest critics of
liberal fair use interpretations, especially their arguments that transformative “purpose” is an
illegitimate category. Part IV looks towards the future, suggesting that broad understandings
of transformativeness are here to stay.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Professor Tony Reese presciently told us that the case law on
fair use transformativeness favored protecting transformative purpose
over transforming content, so that, among other things, exact
reproduction could have a very good shot at fair use.1 Since then,
defendants who made exact copies with transformative purposes
(according to the courts) have done extremely well, while the record of
unauthorized transformed content is somewhat more mixed, though also
increasingly favorable. Purpose-transformativeness, where a work is
reproduced wholesale or nearly so, but in a different context—such as a
news report about a controversial artwork that contains an image of that
artwork—is regularly enough to justify a finding of fair use. Contenttransformativeness, where a work is physically altered, can also lead to a
* Professor, Georgetown Law; co-founder, Organization for Transformative Works.
1. R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 467, 494 (2008).
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fair use finding where the meaning is changed substantially as a result.
The case law is consistent with a broader cultural recognition of the
value of fair use of many flavors. As a founder of the nonprofit
Organization for Transformative Works (OTW),2 which works to
preserve and protect noncommercial fanworks—including fanworks
based on existing copyrighted works—I have a deep commitment to
both purpose-transformativeness and content-transformativeness, since
fanworks regularly perform both kinds of transformations. I have seen
fans exercise their fair use rights with increasing resolve, and the
concept of transformativeness has helped them articulate and defend
their creations.
Most debates about the proper meaning of transformativeness are
really about this larger shift towards more robust fair use.
Transformativeness has indeed become almost synonymous with
fairness, as critics of broad fair use findings charge. Yet those critics’
underlying dispute is with fairness, not with transformativeness: they are
uncomfortable with fair use findings in favor of exact copies, or
sometimes in favor of inexact copies made with different but noncritical
purposes.
The changing ways in which transformativeness has been invoked
provide an example of what Professor Jack Balkin has called
“ideological drift,” in which “legal ideas and symbols will change their
political valence as they are used over and over again in new contexts.”3
More broadly, fair use itself has undergone a process of ideological drift,
with people disagreeing about whether the meaning of fair use has been
fundamentally altered by newer applications, or whether the concept
remains the same but the facts to which it has been applied have
systematically changed.4 Balkin could have been channeling fair use’s
current critics when he wrote that “we are likely to see the phenomenon
of ideological drift at work when individuals complain that ‘a good idea
has been taken too far,’ or that we must return to the ‘original reasons’
behind a doctrine or a symbol.”5 These disputes matter because legal
concepts are both tools that help us understand the world and also
themselves contested ground:
The parties fight on a battlefield in which the shape of the terrain
2. ORG. FOR TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS, www.transformativeworks.org (last visited Apr. 24,
2015).
3. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 871
(1993).
4. Cf. id. at 871–72 (describing similar processes in other legal fields).
5. Id. at 872–73.
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itself is a potential prize. Ideological drift, in this sense, is the
effect of a deeper cause—the struggle over cultural and political
meaning through the practice of politics and persuasion, whose
reward is ideological and rhetorical power.6
Part I of this short Article explores the copyright-restrictionist turn
towards defending fair use, whereas in the past critics of copyright’s
broad scope were more likely to argue that fair use was too fragile to
protect free speech and creativity in the digital age. Part II looks at some
of the major cases supporting that rhetorical and political shift. Although
it hasn’t broken decisively with the past, current case law makes more
salient the freedoms many types of uses and users have to proceed
without copyright owners’ authorization. Part III discusses some of the
strongest critics of liberal fair use interpretations, especially their
arguments that transformative “purpose” is an illegitimate category. Part
IV looks towards the future, suggesting that purpose-transformativeness
is here to stay alongside content-transformativeness, and for good
reason.
As in other instances of ideological drift, changing terminology is
unlikely to change anyone’s substantive agreement or disagreement with
the relevant outcomes. Even if we abandoned transformativeness as an
overriding fair use category, we would still face the same disputes over
which uses should be deemed productive or otherwise fair. I am
confident that both content-transformativeness and purposetransformativeness have important roles to play in the fair use
ecosystem. Critics charge that fair use is unpredictable and inconsistent
with the rest of copyright law, but—like many a building material—a
doctrine can be both flexible and also strong enough to support reliance.
So too with fair use. By embracing transformative fair use’s broad scope
and diversity, we can defend it against critics who argue that
transformativeness has become meaningless or contradictory.
I.

LET US NOW PRAISE FAIR USE

The political valence of transformativeness, and fair use in general,
has changed substantially since the early years after Campbell v. Acuff
Rose Music, Inc.7 At that time, copyright low-protectionists like Diane
Lenheer Zimmerman were skeptical of Campbell’s transformativeness
6. Id. at 877. This is not simply a power struggle, but rather a dispute over the right thing to do
and even over how to determine what the right thing to do is in any given situation. Id. at 877–78;
see also id. at 889 (discussing the deep sincerity of belief that can coexist with ideological drift).
7. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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test,8 which elevated transformation—the creation of new meaning,
message, or purpose—as a key element of fair use. The concept of
transformativeness seemed potentially unstable, especially given the
Court’s unnecessary and ahistorical distinction between favored
“parody” and less-favored “satire.”9 I worried that a focus on
transformativeness would devalue exact copying, which is often
important to particular expressive purposes.10 And Larry Lessig
famously described fair use as “the right to hire a lawyer,” charging that
the doctrine chilled new expression and valuable uses by creating
uncertainty.11
How, then, did fair use go from weak reed to powerful shield in a
decade’s time?12 As the next Part will explain in more detail,
transformativeness developed into an extremely versatile concept as
lower courts applied it to situations far afield of the mocking song in
Campbell. Defendants won significant fair use cases, and a fair use
advocacy bar developed, including public intellectuals defending the
rights of people who would rarely litigate a fair use defense.13 My focus
in this Part, however, is on the rhetoric surrounding fair use outside of
the courts. Very few potential disputes are ever litigated, even in the
lawsuit-happy U.S., and therefore claims of right and understandings
about the law outside the courts are far more important in practice than

8. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem “Transformed”:
Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251, 262 (1998).
9. See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic Than the Real Thing: Parody
Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 982–99 (2004) (detailing absence of historical or
theoretical warrant for parody/satire distinction in copyright).
10. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 555–60 (2004).
11. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) (“[I]n America fair use simply means the
right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”).
12. Though statements about uncertainty can still be found. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker & Clay
Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: Intellectual Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness
Twenty Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 92, 95 (2014) (“In
the immediate aftermath of Campbell and its reception in the lower courts, one perceptive scholar
described the doctrine of transformative use as ‘a scrambled mess.’ Unfortunately, in the ensuing
two decades, the ambiguity surrounding the doctrine has, if anything, increased.” (footnote
omitted)).
13. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org (last
visited May 5, 2015), and Stanford’s Juelsgaard Intellectual Property and Innovation Clinic, STAN.
L. SCH. JUELSGAARD INTELL. PROP. & INNOVATION CLINIC, https://www.law.stanford.edu/
organizations/clinics/juelsgaard-intellectual-property-and-innovation-clinic (last visited May 5,
2015), are only two of the public interest organizations and law school clinics that now support pro
bono representation in fair use cases.
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the law on the books.14
The public discourse on fair use changed, in part in response to
favorable court decisions, but also in significant part because some
activists and institutions emerged as norm entrepreneurs, encouraging
people to believe in and depend on fair use for their activities.15 The
development of large businesses reliant on fair use,16 nonprofit public
interest groups devoted to protecting fair use,17 and activist educators
and artists depending on fair use18 interacted with case law to make fair
use far more robust and reliable than I once feared.
Today, public intellectuals are happy to explain to the general public
that transformativeness protects a wide range of activities.19 A number of
academics have identified patterns in fair use cases that can be used to
predict outcomes and make judgment calls in ordinary practice.20 Peter
14. See LAURA J. MURRAY, S. TINA PIPER, & KIRSTY ROBERTSON, PUTTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN ITS PLACE: RIGHTS DISCOURSES, CREATIVE LABOR, AND THE EVERYDAY 2 (2014)
(explaining that even when statutory and case law is readily available, “people actually choose to
understand the law through information and opinion gathered from friends, strangers, coworkers,
and the media”).
15. See Sepehr Shahshahani, The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair Use Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 273, 322–23 (2015) (“There are many who actively work, not without considerable success,
to improve fair use by helping to shape copyright litigation in the federal courts. The list includes
the Center for Democracy and Technology, Chilling Effects, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the
Free Software Foundation, the NYU Technology Law and Policy Clinic, Public Knowledge, and the
Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic, among many others. These organizations and
their law-professor members bring lawsuits, defend lawsuits, write amicus briefs, compile facts, and
issue reports to raise judicial awareness of copyright abuses and alert judges to the downside of
copyright expansionism.” (footnotes omitted)).
16. See THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY:
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE (2011), available at
http://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/library/CCIA-FairUseintheUSEconomy-2011.pdf
(study prepared for Computer & Communications Industry Association).
17. The OTW is one of these, along with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. What We Believe,
ORG. FOR TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS, http://transformativeworks.org/about/believe (last visited
May 16, 2015) (“We believe that fanworks are transformative and that transformative works are
legitimate. . . . We envision a future in which all fannish works are recognized as legal and
transformative and are accepted as a legitimate creative activity.”).
18. Most prominently represented by the best practices in fair use movement spearheaded by
Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi. See Best Practices, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT,
http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair-use/best-practices (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
19. See, e.g., BRANDON BUTLER, http://brandonbutler.info/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2015);
DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT, http://www.project-disco.org/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2015);
REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG, http://tushnet.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
20. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525 (2004) (detailing a number of predictable patterns); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making
Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 718 (2011) (arguing that there are “patterns in
fair use case law that give the doctrine some measure of coherence, direction, and predictability”);
Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012) (listing factors empirically useful in
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Jaszi and Pat Aufderheide’s initiative to create best practices in fair use
among nonlawyer practitioners in particular fields has seen everincreasing success.21 The clearest example comes from the statement of
fair use best practices for documentary filmmakers, which enabled
filmmakers to get insurance and distribution while relying on fair use,
when once “clearance culture” gatekeepers would have demanded that
every image and sound be licensed.22 As Jaszi and Aufderheide say, fair
use is a muscle that needs to be used to stay in shape23—and, we might
extend the analogy, it gets larger and more defined with vigorous use.
The political utility of claiming that fair use is uncertain has therefore
now shifted. Critics of copyright’s seemingly ever-expanding scope used
to say that fair use wasn’t enough to protect the public interest, and
proponents of expansion used to reassure them that fair use (and the
idea/expression distinction) made any expansion harmless.24 Now, by
contrast, copyright expansionists use fair use’s supposed unreliability as
a reason why fair use shouldn’t actually be considered that important or
useful to users or subsequent creators.25 Copyright restrictionists today
often resist the charge of unpredictability in order to make fair use’s
predicting outcomes); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541
(2009) (fair use case law is “both more coherent and more predictable than many commentators
have perceived”).
21. See generally PETER JASZI & PAT AUFDERHEIDE, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2011); Best Practices, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT,
http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair-use/best-practices (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (collecting a number
of fair use best practices statements).
22. See Robert Kasunic, E&O Insurance for Documentary Films: The Effect of Best Practices in
Fair Use, INTELL. PROP. L. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n Tort Trial & Ins. Practice,
Chicago, Ill.), Summer 2008, at 1, available at http://www.kasunic.com/Articles/ipsummer08.pdf.
23. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF
THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA 28
(2004), available at http://centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_
Report.pdf (quoting documentarian Sam Green).
24. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–90 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (reasoning that fair use “affords considerable latitude for scholarship and
comment” even after copyright term extension).
25. See, e.g., June M. Besek, Jane C. Ginsburg, & Philippa S. Loengard, Comments on ALRC
Discussion Paper 79, Copyright and the Digital Economy 3 (July 31, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344338 (“[The
flexibility of fair use] in many instances comes at the cost of certainty and predictability . . . . [F]air
use decisions are often complicated, and advice frequently depends as much on the amount of risk
the user is willing to undertake as it does on the evaluation of the substantive law.”); see also
GEOFFREY A. MANNE & JULIAN MORRIS, DANGEROUS EXCEPTION: THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF
INCLUDING “FAIR USE” COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 15, 17 (2015),
available at http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/dangerous_exception_final.pdf (arguing that
other legal systems aren’t able to handle subtle, common-law fair use inquiries and that other
countries would misinterpret fair use to protect too much activity).
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reliability a performative reality. This statement, provided by Brandon
Butler, Michael Carroll, and Peter Jaszi as part of a Copyright Office
inquiry into orphan works proposals, states the basic thesis:
Myth: Fair use is unpredictable, and people who are not highly
risk tolerant need more certainty than fair use currently provides.
Representatives of the Copyright Office asked repeatedly
whether the flexibility of the four-factor framework is a
hindrance to all but the most courageous, risk-tolerant actors,
and rights holders claimed there was widespread confusion
about what constitutes fair use.
Fact: Fair use has become a stable, predictable, coherent
doctrine. The courts are applying a unified view of fair use
grounded in the concept of transformativeness, first suggested
by Judge Leval and endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1994, and
for many common categories of use it is possible to make
powerful predictions about how a court will assess specific
examples. There are more and more tools available to users to
help them make these determinations, including best practices
statements developed by user communities. In reality, more and
more people and institutions are relying on fair use on a daily
basis, and only the myth of an arbitrary and capricious fair use
doctrine is preventing others from joining them.26
Or, as Professor Jaszi more bluntly put it before Congress: “Fair use
is working.”27 There is no such thing as perfect certainty—in America,
after all, one can imagine people suing over virtually anything,
copyright-related or not. But fair use provides enough certainty that
ordinary people can go about their day-to-day business using common
sense, just as they can usually do so with respect to other incompletely
specified legal regimes, such as negligence liability in tort.
II.

THE TRIUMPH OF TRANSFORMATIVE EXACT COPIES
Alongside fair use’s robust new public persona, litigated fair use

26. BRANDON BUTLER, MICHAEL CARROLL, & PETER JASZI, IN RE: DOCKET NO. 2012–12,
ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION 1–2 (2014), available at http://copyright.gov/orphan/
comments/Docket2012_12/Butler-Brandon-Carroll-Michael-Jaszi-Peter.pdf (footnotes omitted).
27. The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) (testimony of Professor Peter Jaszi,
Washington College of Law American University, Washington, D.C.). But see Jennifer E. Rothman,
Copyright’s Private Ordering and the “Next Great Copyright Act,” 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1595,
1602–05 (2014) (arguing that claims of predictability are overstated, at least for ordinary
commercial uses).
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defenses have prevailed in situations of great relevance to ordinary
Americans and specialists alike, from search engines to critics of
particular public figures. Specifically, exact copying plus transformative
purpose has a stunningly good fair use record in recent cases. Copies,
both large-scale and selective, have been blessed as transformative by
courts reasoning that exact copies can still have transformative purposes
distinct from the purpose of authorized copies. This Part sketches out the
variety in the case law and its underlying justification in transformative
purpose.
Beginning with the large, indiscriminate copiers: databases for
detecting plagiarism,28 tracking the news,29 aggregating legal briefs,30
and aggregating the text of millions of libraries’ books31 have been held
to be fair use mostly because of their transformativeness, even in the
presence of a commercial purpose. Why are large-scale copying
endeavors transformative? As the Second Circuit explained in Authors
Guild Inc. v. HathiTrust,32
[T]he creation of a full-text searchable database is a
quintessentially transformative use. . . . [T]he result of a word
search is different in purpose, character, expression, meaning,
and message from the page (and the book) from which it is
drawn. Indeed, we can discern little or no resemblance between
the original text and the results of the [HathiTrust database] fulltext search.33
Interpreting this result, a district court concluded in Fox News
Network LLC v. TVEyes Inc.34 that “[t]ransformation almost always
occurs when the new work ‘does something more than repackage or
republish the original copyrighted work.’”35 There are two ways to read
this statement: that doing something more than repackaging or
publishing is almost always transformative, or that transformativeness
can rarely be found unless the new work does something more than
repackaging and republishing. As discussed in Part III, fair use critics
28. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
29. Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
30. White v. West Publ’g Corp., No. 12 CIV. 1340 JSR, 2014 WL 3057885 (S.D.N.Y. July 3,
2014).
31. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
32. 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
33. Id. at 97.
34. 43 F. Supp. 3d 379.
35. Id. at 390.
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fear that the former reading is becoming predominant, to the detriment
of copyright owners’ legitimate interests in controlling and monetizing
their works. No matter which reading is correct, however, creating a new
work that is greater than the sum of its parts has been regularly
recognized as transformative. In TVEyes, for example, the court found
transformativeness when an aggregator of radio and TV news allowed its
users to study the tone of reporting.36 According to the court, “TVEyes’
message, ‘this is what they said’—is a very different message from [Fox
News’]—‘this is what you should [know or] believe.’”37
Selective copying without alteration of the content of the copied work
has also succeeded. Instances of copying deemed to be fair use include:
law firm copying of scientific journal articles for purpose of patent
disclosures,38 copying an expert’s resume for litigation-related
communications,39 copying blog posts for use in a disciplinary
proceeding against the blogger,40 copying a conference call in order to
convey executives’ tone and wording,41 copying music posters as part of
a history of the music group,42 copying an alleged ex-Muslim radical’s
speeches to expose his fraud,43 and even copying photos of people who
were being criticized.44
36. Id. at 392.
37. Id. at 393 (quoting Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 85 (2d
Cir. 2014)) (alterations in original). Jonathan Band suggests that this is similar to the hearsay rule,
which treats statements differently for the purpose of proving they were said versus proving the
truth of the matter asserted. Jonathan Band, Transformative Use and the Hearsay Rule, DISRUPTIVE
COMPETITION PROJECT (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/091114transformative-use-hearsay-rule/.
38. Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-1230-M, 2013 WL 6242843 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 3, 2013) (finding patent-related copying transformative and fair).
39. Devil’s Advocate LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:13-CV-1246, 2014 WL 7238856, at *5
(E.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2014) (“[D]efendant’s submission of Toothman’s resume in the Texas case was
for the purpose of providing notice in a judicial proceeding, a purpose different from the resume’s
intrinsic commercial purpose.”).
40. Denison v. Larkin, No. 1:14-CV-01470, 2014 WL 3953637 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2014) (finding
that disciplinary use had a different purpose than blogger’s purpose of exposing alleged courtroom
corruption).
41. Swatch Grp., 756 F.3d at 85 (copy of recording of Swatch conference call was fair use
because news reporting purpose differed from information conveying purpose of Swatch’s
speakers).
42. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); see also, e.g.,
Warren Publ’g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (similar holding for works of
artist who illustrated many pulp fiction covers).
43. Caner v. Autry, No. 6:14CV00004, 2014 WL 2002835 (W.D. Va. May 14, 2014) (videos of
plaintiff posted to expose his alleged lies were transformative fair use).
44. Katz v. Chevaldina, No. 1222211CIVKING, 2014 WL 2815496 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2014),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1222211CV, 2014 WL 4385690 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5,
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In some ways these cases are even more interesting from the
perspective of transformativeness because the database cases involved
the creation of a resource that wouldn’t otherwise exist. The databases
emerged out of the contributions of many individual components, each
of which has relatively little value to the overall purpose on its own. By
contrast, the individual copying cases recognized transformation in
context-shifting alone, without immersing one work in a flow of many
others. In fact, the Swatch Group Management Services v. Bloomberg,
L.P.45 opinion, which approved as transformative a news outlet’s posting
of the audio of a business earnings call, was even amended after
issuance to make clear that this shift in purpose was itself
transformative.46 That even selective copying is doing rather well
indicates that courts are open to recognizing many types of
transformative purposes.
Transformative purpose, in general, seems to mean that a defendant
has a different interpretive or communicative project than the plaintiff
did in creating the original work. A work created by a creative
photographer in order to depict a person (or a house) can thus have its
purpose changed by a news story about the photo, or by a database
whose goal is to allow searchers to find lots of different pictures
associated with particular keywords.47 A poster designed to promote a
concert by the Grateful Dead can have its purpose changed by a book
chronicling the history of the band.48 Although no communication is
univocal given the variety of interpretive positions held by audiences,
courts have proven willing to find transformative purpose based on
objective characteristics of a particular defendant’s use, such as its
inclusion within a broader context. Swatch is perhaps a pure example of
context change, because the context there was not that the work was
embedded within a larger news story, nor that it was part of a database
of similar works, but that it was reposted in full by a news organization
that existed to disseminate information.49 By contrast, the plaintiff-

2014) (headshot used in article critical of subject was transformative fair use); Dhillon v. Does 110,
No. C 1301465 SI, 2014 WL 722592 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (same).
45. Swatch Grp., 756 F.3d 73.
46. See Andy Sellars, The (Non)Finality of a Fair Use Opinion, CYBERLAW CLINIC: HARV. L.
SCH.,
BERKMAN
CENTER
FOR
INTERNET
&
SOC’Y
(Feb.
23,
2015),
http://cyberlawclinic.berkman.harvard.edu/2015/02/23/fairuse/ (discussing the meaning of the
amended opinion).
47. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
48. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006).
49. Swatch Grp., 756 F.3d at 85.
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owner in Swatch created the work to promote its own non-copyright
financial interests by reassuring investors of its economic viability.50
Even in a world where creators have multiple aims, these particular
purposes can be readily distinguished.
The major fair use loss in the category of selective copying without
alteration, the University of Georgia e-reserves case, involved a lawsuit
against the university for allowing sometimes significant portions of
books and articles to be placed on electronic reserve for courses.51 While
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals accepted that some use would be
fair, it ordered the district court to reconsider its findings by making a
more case-by-case analysis.52 The litigation featured an arguably
unnecessary concession by the university that its copies for use by
students were nontransformative, and thus does not represent a full
exception to transformativeness’ current reign.53
There is one more case that cuts against the “triumph of
transformative purpose” narrative. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S.
Holdings, Inc.54 found that a news monitoring service that downloaded
articles from the internet and allowed keyword searching was not
transformative because it “use[d] its computer programs to automatically
capture and republish designated segments of text from news articles,
without adding any commentary or insight in its New Reports.”55 The
Meltwater court acknowledged that allowing users “to sift through the
deluge of data available through the Internet and to direct them to the
original source . . . . would appear to be a transformative purpose.” But
the defendant didn’t offer “evidence that Meltwater News customers
actually use[d] its service to improve their access to the underlying news
stories that are excerpted in its news feed,” and thus it failed to show that
its service was actually used to transform the original news story into a
datapoint that told a broader story about the overall news reporting
industry.56 Thus, Meltwater—which arguably is now undermined by

50. Id.
51. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999) (ruling that abstracts and
rough translations of Japanese copyrighted content were not transformative).
52. Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d at 1283.
53. See Brandon Butler, Transformative Teaching and Educational Fair Use After Georgia State,
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2568936.
54. 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
55. Id. at 552; see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998) (allowing
dial-in subscribers to listen to live radio over the phone wasn’t fair use).
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subsequent Second Circuit precedent in Swatch and HathiTrust in any
event—does not represent a significant loss for purposetransformativeness.
In fact, even historically, copying an entire work wasn’t so bad for a
fair use finding. Barton Beebe’s empirical study of fair use cases from
1978–2005 found that “[o]f the 99 opinions that addressed facts in which
the defendant took the entirety of the plaintiff’s work, 27.3% found fair
use.”57 And this wasn’t much different from the overall rate of fair use
findings.58 For all the headline-grabbing power of the full copying cases,
then, they don’t represent a comprehensive redefinition of fair use
(though it’s true that the scale of copying in these newer cases is often
larger than that in older cases, because of the technological
developments that produced the newer cases).59
Meanwhile, alteration and partial copying are also succeeding using
theories about transformed purpose and, in particular, transformed
meaning, but with less certainty.60 The most commented-on of these is
surely Cariou v. Prince,61 where the Second Circuit blessed most of
appropriation artist Richard Prince’s copying from a photographer who
found his relatively unsuccessful images of Jamaican men converted into
hundred-thousand-dollar works celebrated by the likes of Beyoncé.62
Cariou featured disagreement among the various judges about whether
56. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 544; see also Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., No. 13
Civ. 5315 AKH, 2014 WL 4444043, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014) (adopting this analysis to
distinguish the TVEyes service).
57. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 616 (2008).
58. Id. at 575–76.
59. See BUTLER, supra note 26, at 3 (“Myth: Fair use case law has developed in a disturbing new
direction in certain courts, or in recent years. . . . Fact: Fair use as applied by courts has evolved into
a clear, coherent, unified doctrine. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that over nearly 20 years
courts have moved decisively away from a series of confusing and contradictory rules of thumb
focused on market harm and toward an emphasis on transformative purpose under the first factor.”
(footnote omitted)).
60. Compare, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013) (use of altered
image in music video was transformative); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d
687 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming a finding of fair use on a motion to dismiss given the clarity of the
transformation, a parody); Arrow Prods., LTD. v. Weinstein Co., 44 F. Supp. 3d 359 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 25, 2014) (recreation of four scenes from movie was fair use), and Northland Family Planning
Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962, 972, 982–93 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (reedited video critiquing original video was fair use), with Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.
2010) (use of Holden Caulfield in quasi-ironic sequel was likely nontransformative), and Warner
Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (encyclopedia of Harry
Potter was insufficiently transformative given amount of exact copying involved).
61. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
62. Id. at 709.
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the meaning or message of Prince’s works so obviously differed from
the meaning or message of Cariou’s as to justify summary judgment.63
By contrast, the pure copying purpose-transformation cases discussed
above have not produced such divided findings. Moreover, by finding
five of the images at issue not physically altered enough to qualify as
transformative fair use for purposes of summary judgment, the majority
in Cariou suggested that merely directing a work at the market for
appropriation art wasn’t necessarily enough for transformativeness.64 At
least when the markets were close enough, a significant change in
content seemed necessary as well. At the same time, Cariou recognized
the relevance of interpretive communities: if a particular community,
such as the world of “high art,” perceives a work as having a new
meaning or message, the court should find transformativeness even if the
court itself is not sure what’s going on.65
The Copyright Office has also recognized various types of contenttransformativeness as fair use in its ruling on exemptions to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act’s prohibition on circumventing access
controls, such as the access protection on DVDs.66 These exemptions
must be re-examined every three years. In 2009, remix artists—
represented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the
OTW—for the first time sought exemptions for remix video, and have
continued to participate in the exemption process. Both in 2009 and
2012, the Office found that significant numbers of noncommercial
remixes were fair use: they took parts of an existing work and used them
to comment on or criticize the work itself, or on some other aspect of the
world.67 The representatives of large copyright industries who opposed
63. See id. at 706–07 (majority opinion); id. at 712–13 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
64. See id. at 711 (majority opinion).
65. See Jonathan Francis, On Appropriation: Cariou v. Prince and Measuring Contextual
Transformation in Fair Use, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 681, 693 (2014) (discussing Cariou’s
recognition of interpretive communities). See generally Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is
Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 (2008) (exploring the
issues surrounding interpretive communities); Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair
Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW & LIT. 20 (2013) (arguing in favor of recognizing
multiplicity of meanings to different communities); Michael W. Tyszko, Whose Expression Is It,
Anyway? Why “New Expression, Meaning, or Message” Should Consider All Reasonably Available
Viewpoints, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 221 (2014) (advocating adoption of multiple reasonable
viewpoints).
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012).
67. See MARIA A. PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: FIFTH TRIENNIAL PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE
EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION 127–28 (Oct. 2012); Memorandum from
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Billington, Librarian of Cong. 66–68 (June
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the current remix exemption proposal have essentially conceded the
point. Though they offered pro forma arguments that remixes weren’t
generally fair use, they also did not oppose the existing exemptions for
remix and argued that the exemptions should only be renewed in their
2012 form, not expanded.68
Not all changes create content-transformativeness: for example, a new
episode of Gilligan’s Island wouldn’t be identical to previous episodes,
but the different ways in which Gilligan bollixed a new attempt to leave
the island wouldn’t necessarily change the meaning or message of the
work.69 By contrast, Jonathan McIntosh’s remix in which Buffy the
Vampire Slayer confronts Twilight’s Edward Cullen, exposing him as a
creepy stalker, uses Buffy as a tool of critique and Twilight as the subject
of that critique.70 Both of these uses give new meanings to the existing
works, and thus the resulting content is transformative.
While purpose-transformativeness has the appeal of protecting
copiers whose projects are opposed or orthogonal to the original authors’
aims—broadly speaking, using the original works as evidence or as bits
of a larger mosaic—content-transformativeness has its own merit.
Content-transformativeness sets up the specifically authorial claims of
people who are making transformative works as equal, or not
subordinate to, the claims of other authors. Thus, both kinds of
transformativeness are important to current doctrine.
There is also one significant nontransformative fair use success:
copying for the benefit of print-disabled library patrons in HathiTrust.71
In that case, libraries’ copies were for the same purpose as the original:
allowing the works to be read, albeit read in accessible formats (large
print, pages that did not need to be turned by hand, or other converted
11, 2010) (regarding recommendation of the Register of Copyrights in RM 2008-8 and rulemaking
on exemptions from prohibition on circumvention of copyright protection systems for access control
technologies).
68. Joint Creators & Copyright Owners, Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under
17 U.S.C. 1201 (Proposed Class #7), at 2–3, available at http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments032715/class%207/Joint_Creators_and_Copyright_Owners_class07_1201_2014.pdf (detailing lack
of opposition to existing exemptions but claiming that remixes are generally infringing); Comments
of the DVD Copy Control Association (“DVD CCA”) on Proposed Class 7, at 2, 3–8, available at
http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715/class%207/DVDCCA_class07_1201_2014.pdf
(same).
69. But cf. Adjmi v. DLT Entm’t Ltd., No. 14 Civ.568 (LAP), 2015 WL 1499575 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2015) (finding a playwright’s dark rewriting of Three’s Company, a lighthearted 1970s sitcom,
to be transformative fair use).
70. See Jonathan McIntosh, Buffy vs. Edward: Twilight Remixed, REBELLIOUS PIXELS (June 20,
2009), http://www.rebelliouspixels.com/2009/buffy-vs-edward-twilight-remixed.
71. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
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formats depending on patrons’ needs) because the audience couldn’t
read the original.72 Although the court deemed this purpose
nontransformative, it was nonetheless fair use because copyright owners
had consistently declined to develop a licensing market for such uses.73
Thus, the access benefits outweighed any potential lost market, which by
all indications was never going to materialize regardless.74
Ultimately, however, there is general consensus that “the
transformative use paradigm, as adopted in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
overwhelmingly drives fair use analysis in the courts today.”75 Use as a
datapoint, as evidence, or as a starting point for some substantive
reworking offering new meanings will all justify a transformativeness
finding, and therefore usually a fair use finding. There’s less consensus
that this variety within transformativeness is a good idea.
III. THE CRITICS
Fair use’s alleged uncertainty, addressed in Part I, isn’t its only
failing, according to its critics. As Congress, the Copyright Office, and
even the Patent and Trademark Office start to consider possible revision
of the Copyright Act, and as other nations examine the U.S. model of
fair use as part of reconsidering their own exceptions and limitations,
some people have warned that current judicial interpretations of fair use
are far too broad. These critics are attempting to push the pendulum back
towards restrictive interpretations and even to suggest that our current
case law may violate our obligations under the Berne Convention.76
While I hope they fail, their arguments against a broad and flexible fair
use doctrine are worth addressing.
72. Id. at 101.
73. Id. at 103.
74. Id.
75. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][b] (2013)
(stating that transformative has become a shorthand for fair, and not transformative has become a
shorthand for not fair); Neil Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715,
734 (2011); see also Beebe, supra note 57, at 605–06.
76. Jane C. Ginsburg, Letter from the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain
Compliance with International Norms — Part II (Fair Use) 3 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 503, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539178 (“The potential disparities
between the U.S. fair use exception and the three-step test have long attracted the attention of
scholars. . . . U.S. authorities could reasonably contend that, in practice, courts’ actual application of
the exception remained consonant with international standards. Recent U.S. fair use decisions,
however may challenge the credibility of that assertion.” (footnote omitted)); The Scope of Fair
Use, supra note 27 (statement of June M. Besek, Executive Director of the Kernochan Center for
Law, Media and the Arts and Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law School) (making the same
argument).
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At recent congressional hearings on fair use, for example,
representatives of the large copyright industries such as book and music
publishing cautioned that courts have found fair use in too many cases.77
They had no enthusiasm for congressional intervention into the guts of
the Copyright Act at this time, given that they’d likely have to trade
some consumer-friendly reforms for any statutory change cutting back
on fair use, but they wished to put a public marker down on what they
considered unacceptable.
June Besek, at Columbia’s Kernochan Center, argued both before
Congress and at a Copyright Office roundtable that fair use has
expanded to the point that some copyright provisions are now
“meaningless”78 and that fair use has become too defendant-favorable.79
For example, she believed that HathiTrust (then on appeal from a fair
use ruling by the district court) mistakenly found fair use in university
libraries’ mass digitization of works, because that made the libraryspecific exemptions of Section 108 irrelevant.80 These exceptions are
both broader than fair use in some respects and narrower in others; the
Second Circuit easily rejected an argument based on Section 108, which
explicitly does not interfere with fair use.81 I raise Besek’s point not to
agree with it, but to illustrate her concern that fair use is protecting
conduct that Congress otherwise chose not to protect.
Professor Jane Ginsburg, a longstanding copyright expansionist
whose views are always worth serious consideration, has turned her
attention outwards. It may be too late for us, but perhaps other nations
can be warned off of our current fair use path, and possibly even provide
77. See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 6–7 (testimony of Kurt Wimmer, General
Counsel, Newspaper Association of America) (arguing that Congress should keep its hands off, but
that “some courts’ recent willingness to give undue weight to the concept of ‘transformative use’ in
connection with the first fair-use factor risks eroding fundamental copyright protections.” (footnote
omitted)).
78. Orphan Works and Mass Digitization Roundtables, LIBRARY OF CONG. 39 (Mar. 10, 2014),
available at http://copyright.gov/orphan/transcript/0310LOC.pdf (statement of June Besek) (“I’ve
said that fair use has incredibly expanded over the past several years and I think it’s expanded to the
point that it is distorting the law. It’s sort of taken over some of the other exceptions. . . . I think
essentially fair use has made some provisions simply meaningless . . . .”).
79. The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 12 (statement of June M. Besek).
80. Id. at 10.
81. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 94 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Plaintiffs argue that
the fair use defense is inapplicable to the activities at issue here, because the Copyright Act includes
another section, 108, which governs ‘Reproduction [of copyrighted works] by Libraries . . .’ 17
U.S.C. § 108. However, section 108 also includes a ‘savings clause,’ which states, ‘Nothing in this
section in any way affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107 . . . .’ § 108(f)(4). Thus,
we do not construe § 108 as foreclosing our analysis of the Libraries’ activities under fair use, and
we proceed with that analysis.”).
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some pressure to turn us back in the other direction. Both in a “Letter
from the US”82 and in a submission to the Australian Law Reform
Commission with her colleagues,83 Professor Ginsburg set out her
concerns with the growing—in her view, metastasizing—scope of fair
use.
One primary criticism of transformativeness from Ginsburg and
others identifies a conflict between the concept of “transformation” in
fair use doctrine and the derivative works right, which in the statute’s
language allows the copyright owner to claim rights in works that are
“transformed” as well as “adapted.”84 Thus, it could be difficult to tell
which works ought to be deemed infringing derivative works and which
protected fair uses.85 Content-transformativeness, Ginsburg suggests,
“makes fair use even more indeterminate and unpredictable than before
(some level of indeterminacy and unpredictability being inherent to the
flexibility that is the hallmark of fair use), because
‘transformativenes[s]’ may be entirely in the eye of the judicial
beholder.”86
A recent Seventh Circuit case, Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC,87
echoed Ginsburg’s concerns. Kienitz involved the use of a photo of the

82. See Ginsburg, supra note 76.
83. Besek, Ginsburg, & Loengard, supra note 25.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “derivative work”).
85. See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 8–10 (statement of June M. Besek)
(arguing that post-Campbell cases have inappropriately contracted the derivative works right); 2
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.49 (3d ed. 2005 & 2007 Supp.) (“On principle,
the rule [weighing transformativeness in favor of fair use] threatens to undermine the balance that
Congress struck in section 106(2)’s derivative rights provision to give copyright owners exclusive
control over transformative works to the extent these works borrow copyrightable expression from
the copyrighted work.”); Reese, supra note 1, at 468 (“The rise of transformativeness as an explicit,
and important, aspect of fair use analysis obviously has potential implications for the copyright
owner’s exclusive right . . . to prepare derivative works . . . , since derivative works seem, by
definition, to involve some transformation of the underlying work.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright
and Intermediate Users’ Rights, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 67, 69–71 (1999); Jeremy Kudon,
Form Over Function: Expanding the Transformative Use Test for Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. REV. 579,
592–93 (2000); Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 720–21 (1995); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of
Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 126–27 (2001). But see Pamela
Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J.
1505 (2013) (setting forth a framework for properly defining the derivative works right without a
conflict with fair use).
86. Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 21; see also Francis, supra note 65, at 682 (“This reliance on
physical alteration leaves a creator unsure of just how much alteration is needed before a court will
find her new work has altered the original’s expression sufficiently to manifest new and different
meaning.”).
87. 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
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mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, a formerly hard-partying student at the
university there who now wanted to control students’ exuberance (and
drunkenness).88 A local business removed the background of the photo,
posterized and colored the image of the mayor’s face, and put it on a Tshirt with the phrase “sorry for partying.”89 The photographer sued, and
the court of appeals affirmed a finding of fair use, but only after
criticizing transformativeness.90
The Kienitz court commented that transformativeness doesn’t appear
in the Copyright Act, though the Supreme Court “mentioned” it in
Campbell, which is like downplaying Article III courts as merely
“mentioned” in the Constitution.91 The court then expressed its
“skeptic[ism]” about prioritizing transformativeness over the plain text
of the statute because of the potential effect of transformativeness on the
derivative works right:
To say that a new use transforms the work is precisely to say
that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected under
§ 106(2). Cariou and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do
not explain how every “transformative use” can be “fair use”
without extinguishing the author’s rights under § 106(2).92
Instead, the court decided to “stick with the statutory list,” and the
most important factor was the fourth, market effect, which ultimately
favored fair use.93 (This interpretive re-prioritizing of Supreme Court
decisions by a court of appeals is a kind of “underruling.”94)
Unfortunately, Kienitz doesn’t tell us what the first fair use factor
does attempt to privilege and deprivilege, if not transformativeness.
Instead, the Seventh Circuit used its own test, worded in the language of
economics: “whether the contested use is a complement to the protected
work (allowed) rather than a substitute for it (prohibited).”95 Where this
concept appears in the Copyright Act is left as an exercise for the reader.
More importantly, the complement/substitute opposition requires some

88. Id. at 757.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 758.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variation on the Themes of Robert
M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 82 (1989) (arguing that “when push comes to
shove, the [lower court] judge may . . . . in effect, ‘overrule’ (or, perhaps a better term, given the
relationships of the courts, ‘underrule’) [lawless precedent]”).
95. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
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baseline for understanding the appropriate scope of the copyright right—
the markets to which copyright owners are entitled—just as
transformativeness does.
I obviously disagree with Ginsburg and with Kienitz:
Transformativeness is a flexible standard for identifying uses with new
meanings, messages, or purposes outside of the bounds the copyright
owner reasonably deserves to control. Transformativenesss doesn’t make
all derivative works into fair uses, and the Second Circuit in Cariou
didn’t purport to reject prior case law so finding.96 And, as noted above
in Part II, fair use has sufficient predictability to serve as the basis for
action in many cases.
Indeed, to the extent that fair use’s critics like fair use at all, it is for
content-transformativeness: uses that create new creative works.97 And
it’s this somewhat conflicted relationship with contenttransformativeness that leads to one of the most interesting features of
the new criticism of transformativeness: Transformative purpose, though
it makes copyright expansionists see red, simply doesn’t pose the same
conceptual conflict with the derivative works right as transformative
content. As Professor Reese’s careful analysis established, courts finding
fair use transformativeness were relatively uninterested in whether a
defendant’s use transformed a plaintiff’s work in the sense of creating a
derivative work.98 Courts did not use the creation of a derivative work as
evidence of transformative fairness, nor were they using the fact of mere
reproduction as evidence of unfairness.99 As noted in Part II, that pattern
has, if anything, only intensified. Thus, fears about the overlap between
transformativeness and derivative works—including mine100—were
overstated.
Instead, the database and historical uses that have been protected by
the pure transformative purpose line of cases involve the creation of
allegedly infringing reproductions, not allegedly infringing derivative
works. As pure copies, they can’t conflict with the derivative works
96. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Indeed, in its recent Salinger opinion, the Second Circuit endorsed a disturbingly narrow
characterization of content-transformativeness, suggesting that a novel that followed an older,
broken-down Holden Caulfield was not transformative or fair. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68,
83 (2d Cir. 2010).
97. See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 14 (statement of June M. Besek) (noting
that fair use’s “most appropriate role” is “fostering new authorship”); MANNE & MORRIS, supra
note 25, at 15 (suggesting that fair use is supposed to encourage the creation of “derivative works”).
98. Reese, supra note 1, at 484, 494.
99. Id.
100. See Tushnet, supra note 10, at 555–60.

14 - Tushnet.doc (Do Not Delete)

888

6/3/2015 1:32 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:869

right. Yet fair use’s critics oppose the transformative purpose cases such
as HathiTrust and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,101 which found
that creating thumbnail images for use in online image search was fair
use,102 with even more fervor.103 For example, rather than regarding
purpose as something that can legitimately be transformed, Ginsburg
argues that these cases actually rest on false premises that certain
beneficial uses deserve a subsidy from copyright owners and that a
market failure prevents a licensing regime from emerging to allow these
beneficial uses.104 The inapplicability of the “overlap with derivative
works” criticism to the database cases reveals that Ginsburg and her
colleagues’ real disagreement lies with fair use’s strength, not with its
alleged conceptual fuzziness.105
Other criticisms of transformativeness are equally awkward as applied
to the database cases. For example, some have complained that cases
like Cariou leave transformativeness in the eye of the beholder, who
might perceive a new meaning or message based on any change—or
not.106 But how does the meaning or message of a database appear to a
reasonable observer, compared to the meaning or message of a single
work? It seems a very weird question even to ask. No matter one’s
interpretive community, the two seem like very different types of
communicative objects.
Relatedly, Reese asks a number of cogent questions about the

101. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 5, 8 (statement of June M. Besek)
(criticizing application of transformativeness to complete copies or “functional transformation”); cf.
Kathleen K. Olson, Transforming Fair Use Online: The Ninth Circuit’s Productive-Use Analysis of
Visual Search Engines, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 153, 167 (2009) (while supporting the outcomes in
such fair use cases, calling purpose-transformativeness an “absurd conception of transformative
use”).
104. See Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 4; Jonathan Band, The Future of Fair Use After Google
Books, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/
intellectual-property/021114-the-future-of-fair-use-after-google-books/ (describing criticisms of
lawyer Jon Baumgarten that the new approach to purpose-transformativeness merely asks if the new
use was socially beneficial).
105. See Laura Quilter, Fair Use Week—How Parodies Transformed Fair Use, COPYRIGHT &
INFO. POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015), http://blogs.umass.edu/lquilter/2015/02/23/fair-use-week-howparodies-transformed-fair-use/ (“[T]he criticisms are less about whether the doctrine is correct or
not, and more a complaint that the concept has been too successful.”).
106. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 711 (2d Cir. 2013) (“What is critical is how the work in
question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say about a particular
piece or body of work.”); cf. Andrew Gilden & Timothy Greene, Fair Use for the Rich and
Fabulous?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 88, 98–100 (2013) (criticizing Cariou’s reasoning as
unduly malleable).
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meaning of “purpose” that simply seem easier to answer in the mass
copying cases. As he notes, the court has to have some sense of the
plaintiff’s purpose to determine whether the defendant’s purpose is
transformative.107 Whether the appropriate standard is subjective (what
the author actually had in mind) or objective (what reasonable authors of
this type of work would have in mind), and whether or not courts
recognize multiple authorial purposes,108 “I intend to create a database of
lots of works” is rarely if ever going to be a plausible purpose for the
creator of an individual work, or even for any transferee. Even if the
author intends database-type use, once the author sees that doing so is
possible,109 she can’t do it on her own as long as there’s more than one
copyright owner in the world. This makes the author’s claim to
encompass the “big data” purpose less plausible.110
Indeed, the conceptual argument against content-transformativeness
seems to be more persuasive, at least on a case-by-case basis, than the
argument against purpose-transformativeness as applied to large-scale
uses that generate benefits that individual, unaggregated works couldn’t.
Thus, a recent article on fair use cases quoted Professor Lateef Mtima
calling content-transformativeness cases “a snake pit” because of courts’
need to judge the aesthetics of any transformation.111 Others expressed
the opinion that courts were likely to move the pendulum back against
fair use, with 2014 likely to mark its furthest extension.112 But even
though key 2014 cases were purpose-transformative cases,
107. Reese, supra note 1, at 494; see also Bunker & Calvert, supra note 12, at 121–25 (arguing
that defining purpose is unstable in individual-copying cases).
108. Reese, supra note 1, at 494–95.
109. Id. at 495.
110. Professor Thomas Cotter disagrees, arguing that any author’s purpose can be described at a
sufficient level of abstraction that the parties’ purposes will be the same. Thomas F. Cotter,
Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 701, 721 (2010). For
example, both the individual photographer and the image search engine intend to provide
information. I find this unpersuasive; even Cotter has to concede that the “immediate” purpose of
the parties’ endeavors differs in mass copying cases, id., and I don’t see evidence that courts are
more incoherent about purpose-transformation than they are about anything else. (Transformation’s
role in right of publicity cases is a different matter.) Moreover, if we said “the author intends to
license her work for database use,” even if “licensing” were not an empty abstraction rather than a
purpose, that still wouldn’t be the same as the database creator’s purpose of making a database
through aggregation.
111. Anandashankar Mazumdar, Digital-Age Strain on Copyrights Continues; Action Coming
from Courts Not Congress, 20 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 121 (Jan. 28, 2015); cf. N.J. Media
Grp., Inc. v. Pirro, No. 13 CIV. 7153 ER, 2015 WL 542258, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015) (finding
that incorporation of a photo of 9/11 firefighters into a viral meme comparing them to Marines
raising the flag at Iwo Jima was arguably nontransformative).
112. Mazumdar, supra note 111 (quoting Professors Zahr Said and Roger Schecter).
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prognosticators predicted retrenchment in content-transformativeness:
Professor Roger Schechter argued that “the ascension of the concept of
transformative use has ‘seriously cut back’ on the copyright holder’s
rights of adaptation and preparation of derivative works,” and
library/tech industry lawyer Jonathan Band also thought that plaintiff
victories would come “more with the appropriation art cases or
something like that,” based on the conflict with the derivative works
right.113 Band continued: “But in the tech cases, where you don’t see the
copies—like the HathiTrust case or the Google case . . . . what’s
transformative is that you’re making a database for a different purpose—
search,” and he predicted that those cases would remain untouched.114
Individualized determinations about content-transformativeness do
seem likely to remain more hard-fought and contextual than the
orthogonal purposes approved in the pure copying cases, which may be
ironic from the perspective of the critics, but only to be expected in an
area of law subject to ideological drift. It’s in content-transformativeness
that we have the most significant questions to ask about the roles of
differing interpretive communities in identifying transformed meaning.
But, in order to preserve equal freedom of interpretation for all such
communities, whether federal judges are part of them or not, it is vital to
recognize that different audiences may take different meanings from the
same work, so that what seems like a critical transformation to one
group may seem trivial to another. Where the target audience would find
new meanings or messages, courts should recognize contenttransformativeness even if they (or I) don’t see it. Narrower alternatives,
such as those suggested by fair use’s critics, run too much risk of
suppressing speakers who don’t speak in a language familiar to the
court.115
The relatively new epistemological humility expressed in cases such
as Cariou is a welcome respite from what Zahr Said has characterized as
formalism in the mode of New Criticism, in which judges treat works as
having only one correct meaning.116 Abandoning certainty about the true
meaning of a work—whether that work is the plaintiff’s or the
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Jonathan Band).
115. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one
extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. . . . until the public had learned
the new language in which their author spoke.”).
116. See Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 13–16 (July 26, 2014), available at
ssrn.com/abstract=2472500.
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defendant’s—is uncomfortable, especially for judges trained to fix
meaning whenever possible. People have always fought over the
meaning of texts, though, and advocates for broad fair use protections
will have to continue that fight when it comes to transformed content, no
matter how entrenched the pure copying/transformative purpose cases
become as a matter of copyright doctrine.
IV. WHAT’S NEXT?
The present ideal behind the criticism of transformativeness is pretty
much the same as it has always been: There should be an authorized
market for every copy.117 Unauthorized productive uses, or unauthorized
transformative uses, aren’t, in general, justified, given owners’ interest
in control.118 Exceptions and limitations should be highly constrained,
ideally for listed purposes like comment, news reporting, and criticism.
In addition, copyright owners should have strong moral rights, limited
only as a last resort.
For those who find this vision unattractive, transformative use is a
good alternative. Transformativeness, despite its potential ambiguities,
has the capacity to recognize the uses that we find valuable and that we
believe copyright owners shouldn’t control. When high-protectionists
argue that fair use is too broad, and that uses that should be controlled by
copyright owners are escaping control, transformativeness provides
ways to respond. When copyright owners make incentive and moral
rights claims based on authorial labor, transformativeness has incentivebased and desert-based responses. Transformative uses generally involve
the addition of labor to create value, whether that labor is in building an
interpretive scaffold around a work, changing the work to send a
different message, or putting the work together with numerous other
117. See Jessica D. Litman, Fetishizing Copies, in RUTH OKEDIJI, COPYRIGHT IN AN AGE OF
LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 3–4 (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2506867 (“Copy-fetish has persuaded others that fair use has somehow run amok because
copyright owners are losing lawsuits that they would probably never have brought if they didn’t feel
obliged to protect themselves from all unlicensed copies.”); id. at 18 (“Copy-fetishists have
demonstrated that they view the mere existence of any unlicensed copy as an invasion of their
prerogatives. In the HathiTrust case, the Authors Guild was willing to spend millions of dollars in
an effort to ensure that even invisible unlicensed copies were eradicated.”); MANNE & MORRIS,
supra note 25, at 12, 16 (arguing that licensing should supplant fair use whenever possible).
118. See, e.g., Written Comments of Copyright Clearance Center Inc., COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE
CENTER 2–4 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/copyright_clearance_
center_comments.pdf (arguing that rights should generally be entirely exclusive and all uses should
be licensed); Comments of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, NAT’L
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. 9–10 (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
ascap_comments.pdf (arguing that essentially all uses of music should be licensed).
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works in order to search across them. The defendant’s labor is of the
kind that the original copyright owner generally couldn’t or wouldn’t
perform. No book’s copyright owner has the ability to code a Googlestyle database; Swatch would never create objective reporting on its own
economic prospects; abortion clinics wouldn’t allow uses of their videos
to condemn abortion.
I believe these cases were rightly decided, even if having an
expansive fair use doctrine means that its contours will never be defined
down to the microscopic level. In American law, there is rarely if ever a
doctrine defined sufficiently to be one hundred percent predictable. Fair
use doesn’t need to be perfect to do its job—like parenting, it just has to
be good enough.
After a long time, fair use has finally adapted to the relatively new,
higher default level of copyright protection.119 In the process, its public
persona has changed, from a ninety-pound weakling to a mixed martial
arts champion with a number of different strengths. Both in practices
outside the courts and in fair use findings, flexibility has replaced
uncertainty; the same statutory factors look different in new political and
social circumstances. Given the variety of circumstances in which
copyright law now operates, we shouldn’t be surprised that there are also
different clusters of fair uses, including both pure copying and
alterations. This diversity is fair use’s strength, not its weakness.

119. See Jessica Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 651 (2015).

